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Forty years after the Second World War, the international refugee cri-
sis shows few signs of abating. Millions of persons continue to flee their
states of nationality in search of safe havens, and the underlying conflicts
in their home states that caused their flight often lack any hope of resolu-
tion. States of asylum are now realizing that their refugees may become
long-term visitors. The refugees, for their part, fear their states of nation-
ality and seek protection from their new home. International refugee law
has proved slow to deal with the conflicts governments face as exiled
citizens, still nominally "protected" by their home state, seek to adjust to
their state of asylum. Refugee law must clarify the role that the state of
nationality should play once a refugee has fled it.
This Article proposes a norm of international refugee law wherein the
state of origin, by breaking its ties with a refugee, loses any right to "pro-
tect" or act on behalf of the refugee, until such time as the refugee will-
ingly returns to that state. Part I offers a detailed definition and
explanation of the concept of protection and the variety of activities it is
often said to entail. Part II describes the position of the refugee as the
quintessentially unprotected person. Part III outlines the role that pro-
tection plays in international law. It analyzes the interaction between
nationality and protection and discusses the right of a state to protect its
nationals both at home and abroad. Part IV looks back at the evolving
notions of protection, emphasizing the shift from protection based upon
residence to protection based upon formal requirements of nationality.
The focus of the Article, the attempt by the state of nationality to assert
its power over the refugee in his new residence, stems directly from the
changing view of protection. Part V thus offers a new theory, emphasiz-
ing the irrelevance of a refugees's official nationality and proposing a
legal ban on any protective measures by the state of origin.
t Professor of International Law, University of Bergen (Norway).
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Protection of Refugees
I. The Concept of Protection
A. Facets of Protection
"Protection," like "asylum,"1 is a word of many facets. In treatises of
international law, it is traditionally used to denote two types of state ac-
tivities. First, it may refer to the practice whereby a state's diplomatic
or consular agents take up foreign matters concerning that state's nation-
als-individuals or corporations-to ensure the rights and benefits guar-
anteed those individuals or corporations under general international law
or international agreement. 2 Second, protection is used to refer to a
state's presenting of claims against another state alleging the latter's re-
sponsibility under international law for an injury suffered by an individ-
ual or a corporation of the former, in order to obtain reparation. 3
Protection in these limited senses can be exercised for the benefit of
only a small number of persons. The concept undoubtedly means more
than this. Article l(A)(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees makes it a condition of refugee status that a person be "unable
or . . . unwilling to avail himself of the protection of [the country of
nationality]." '4 In this context, protection cannot have the traditional
textbook meaning in which it is neither explicitly requested nor denied.
Protection, therefore, consists partly of the opportunity to apply to the
diplomatic or consular authorities representing one's home country for a
passport or a certificate of citizenship. This type of document allows the
holder to claim such benefits as a visa and a residence or work permit.
These arrangements, however, do not exhaust the range of measures
falling within the general notion of protection. The Statute of the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 5 enu-
merates many activities through which the High Commissioner shall
provide for the protection of refugees. 6 Most of these activities treat ref-
ugees collectively. They include efforts on behalf of refugees to promote
new international agreements, to solicit general benefits for refugees, and
1. See 2 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-7
(1972).
2. See E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 349-54 (1922).
3. Id.
4. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, 152 [hereinafter cited as Convention on Status of Refugees]. The United States
signed the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees on Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, which entered into force Oct. 4, 1967.
5. 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46; U.N. Doe. A/1775 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
UNHCR Statute].
6. Id. para. 8.
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to maintain contact with governments as well as with various govern-
mental, intergovernmental, and nongovermental organizations.
The term "protection" as currently used in international law in gen-
eral, and in refugee law in particular, thus encompasses a broad spectrum
of activities. These include:
-negotiating and concluding international agreements for the benefit
of individuals and corporations;
-soliciting benefits for certain categories of persons;
-providing persons with documents enabling them to reap the bene-
fits of agreements and other "deals" and arrangements between entities;
-taking up the case of persons against authorities of a foreign state
either to ensure compliance with an agreement or a rule of general inter-
national law, or to claim for such persons some benefit, exemption, or
privilege; and
-pressing claims for reparation, either restitution or indemnity, for
injustice, inconvenience, or damage that a person has suffered and that
may be directly or indirectly imputable to a foreign state, an interna-
tional organization, or some other international actor.
The agency exercising protection will often, but not always, be a state.
International organizations and organs may also exercise protection in
certain circumstances. The Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees was created for the very purpose of protecting refu-
gees.7 Even nongovernmental organizations and large corporations may
exercise protection. Significantly, protected individuals or corporations
need not be citizens or ressortissantss of the protecting state or other en-
tity. The great number of international instruments pertaining to refu-
gees bear witness to this fact.9 By international agreement, persons may
even be protected against the state whose citizenship they possess. This
possibility follows from the conventions and covenants protecting human
rights and fundamental freedoms.' 0
7. Id. para. 1.
8. Ressortissants are "protected persons." See infra note 67.
9. A number of such instruments are reproduced in COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING REFUGEES (2d ed. 1979) (UNHCR publication). See also infra
notes 28, 51, 68, 69.
10. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Nov. 22. 1969, 36 O.A.S.T.S. 1., reprinted in R. LILLICH, INTERNA-




B. Customary Protection: Diplomatic and Consular Protection
Customary or traditional protection of individuals falls into two cate-
gories. Diplomatic protection signifies protection on a government-to-
government level. Such protection may be classified as general or partic-
ular. General diplomatic protection aims at improving conditions of per-
sons at large through the negotiation and conclusion of general accords
or specific agreements for citizens of the states concerned, for stateless
persons, or for refugees. Particular diplomatic protection denotes meas-
ures undertaken to safeguard or advance the interests of particular indi-
viduals or corporations, as well as measures to press for reparations for
wrongs suffered by any person claimed by the state to be a ressortissant of
that state. The second type of customary protection, consular protection,
is normally exercised at a lower level than diplomatic protection.1' Con-
sular functions, outlined in the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions12 and spelled out in more detail in the European Convention on
Consular Functions,' 3 fall within the category of general protection.
C. Contractual, International, and Nongovernmental Protection
More novel modes of protection also exist. The notion of contractual
protection'4 derives from the rule of international law that every state
party to a treaty has the right to ensure that all other parties fulfill their
obligations in good faith.' 5 If the treaty or convention confers benefits
upon individuals, 16 each state may demand that other signatory states
respect the rights given to individuals. States may even intervene to
guarantee such rights.' 7
11. This characteristic may be obscured in cases where embassies also double as consu-
lates-general.
12. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No.
6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
13. European Convention on Consular Functions, Dec. 11, 1967, Europ. T. S. No. 61 (has
not yet come into force)..
14. Contractual protection could also be called "conventional protection" in the sense of
protection based on a treaty or convention. However, since the term "conventional protec-
tion" could be misinterpreted as traditional protection, "contractual protection" is preferable.
15. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 877-81 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955)
(discussion of pacta sunt servanda, binding force of treaties) [hereinafter cited as L. OPPEN-
HEIM & H. LAUTERPACHT].
16. See, e.g., Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, and human rights conven-
tions cited supra note 10.
17. Related to this aspect of state action is the protection of residents, such as resident
refugees, which states may exercise by express agreement or through informal understandings
with other states. See, e.g., European Convention on Consular Functions, supra note 13.
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International protection is protection exercised by an international or-
gan or organization for individuals under its mandate.18 Such protection
may be based on explicit convention provisions, such as article 35 of the
Convention on the Status of Refugees, 19 or on other grounds, such as
provisions of the UNHCR Statute20 or resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly.21 A special type of international protection, exercisa-
ble by organizations on behalf of their agents, was described in the advi-
sory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Bernadotte
case.22 Finally, actions amounting to protection may be taken by non-
governmental organizations, notably voluntary humanitarian agencies,
and even by corporations. 23 These activities, variously defined as virtual
protection, quasi-protection or protection-like activities, fall under the
heading of "nongovernmental protection."
D. Protection vs. Assistance
International protection must be distinguished from international
assistance. Protection suggests a tripartite relationship: one party pro-
tects a second against either a third party or forces of nature. Assistance,
on the other hand, denotes a bilateral relationship between a provider
and a recipient. Though in principle the distinction is clear, in practice
borderline cases often arise. If a resident or visiting alien encounters dif-
ficulties with territorial authorities, he may appeal for the protection of
his country's local consul. If the alien is penniless, he may approach the
consul for assistance, in the form of a ticket home. If, for example, he
has lost a passport and turns to the consul for a new one, the consul's
response could entail both protection and assistance. When an alien re-
quires a passport to obtain a residence permit or to leave the country, the
issuance of an emergency passport or other document may be interpreted
as a request that the territorial authorities allow the person to stay or to
18. This is "legal and political protection" in the parlance of the International Refugee
Organization (IRO). See L. HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION: A
SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ITS HISTORY AND WORK 1946-1952, at
311-28 (1956).
19. See supra note 4.
20. See supra note 5, para. 8(c)-(h).
21. See generally U.N. Resolutions and Decisions relating to the Office of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/INF. 48/Rev. 3 (1983).
22. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 1
(Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11). Count Bernadotte was murdered while carrying out his duties
as United Nations Mediator in Palestine. The General Assembly asked the I.C.J. for an Advi-
sory Opinion on the capacity of the U.N. to bring an international claim against the responsi-
ble government to obtain reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the U.N. The Court
upheld such a capacity both for injuries to the U.N. and to individuals. Id. at 187.




leave without hindrance. This represents a protective measure. But if, as
in Denmark and Sweden, there is no official control over departing
aliens,24 the issuance of a passport serves primarily to allow the bearer to
enter his own country unimpeded. This more closely resembles a case of
assistance, since the relationship involves only the issuing state and its
citizen. The same result could have been achieved through a'telephone
call or telex message from the consul to his country's immigration ser-
vice. The gray area between assistance and protection becomes apparent
in the context of a typical refugee situation, involving the provision of
care and sustenance in a refugee camp. Such care clearly constitutes
assistance, as it involves a bilateral act between the providing agency and
the refugee. Yet, to provide this assistance, an international organ such
as the UNHCR may first have to negotiate an agreement with territorial
authorities and then obtain permission to admit the refugee to the camp.
These negotiations are embraced by the notion of protection. Further-
more, when local authorities near a refugee camp learn of an agency's
interest in the person, they may wish to aid in dispensing benefits. Com-
monly, these authorities want to maintain a positive relationship with
such agencies; hence, the agencies have leverage to intervene on behalf of
affected persons. What is designed as an assistance measure may thus
have protective effects.
E. Passports and Protection
According to one traditional view, a passport is "a document of iden-
tity issued by a state, ordinarily to its own nationals, which requests for-
eign governments to grant the bearer safe and free passage and all lawful
aid and protection while within their jurisdiction, and implicitly guaran-
tees that they will be readmitted to the issuing country." 25 This descrip-
tion offers little guidance in practical terms. A passport need not
necessarily be issued by a state; it is not always trustworthy as an identity
document or proof of citizenship; and it does not always contain an ex-
plicit request to foreign governments.2 6 It does, however, implicitly
guarantee the readmittance of the bearer to the territory of the issuing
(state) authority.27 A passport could be all the things suggested in the
above description, but it need not be any of them.
24. Only a routine airport security check is performed.
25. D. TURACK, THE PASSPORT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1972) (quoting CANADIAN
DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (1953)).
26. British and American passports do contain such a request for protection.
27. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. There are passports that do not allow the
bearer to enter the territory of the issuing state. This applies to some British passports and
also to certain passports issued by the Republic of China in Taiwan to Chinese not resident on
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Foreign governments generally require that aliens admitted or allowed
to stay in their territories possess a passport or some other recognized
travel document. 28 A government may be less inclined to admit foreign-
ers if it cannot oust them when it deems necessary. Under international
law, a state must readmit its citizens to its territory at the request of a
foreign government;29 however, if a foreigner is admitted without any
papers, or with an identity card alone, he may be returned to the country
of which he is a citizen only if his citizenship is undisputed or can be
proved by the returning state. If, on the other hand, he is admitted on
the strength of a national passport, his citizenship is presumed, and the
issuing state is obliged to readmit him throughout the period his passport
is valid and for a short while beyond. The issuing state can refuse admis-
sion only if it can prove that the bearer is actually the citizen of another
state. Thus, issuance of a passport shifts, the burden of proving citizen-
ship onto the issuing state.
While a passport is an eminently practical document, it possesses a
mystique all its own. According to Borchard, the United States govern-
ment insists that foreign governments treat an American passport as
prima facie proof of American citizenship.30 American authorities ex-
pect that bearers of American passports be given all the rights and bene-
fits to which American citizens are entitled in a foreign country, unless
authorities can show cause for not accepting the bearer's American citi-
zenship. A foreign government that admits a foreigner on the strength of
an American passport risks intervention by United States diplomatic or
consular services if it does not treat the foreigner as American authorities
expect Americans to be treated. A similar significance is attached to the
passport in many, if not most, states.31
the island. See Young v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, BVerwG IC 138.60, Mar. 23, 1964,
cited in I A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191
(1966).
28. In this role, the ordinary national passport competes with other documents, such as
refugee travel documents and laissez-passes. See Resolution of the Third General Conference
on Communication and Transit, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 54, at 201 (1927);
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, art. 28 with Schedule,
360 U.N.T.S. 117, 152 (entered into force June 6, 1960) [hereinafter cited as Convention on
Stateless Persons]; Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. 28 and Schedule. Be-
tween a number of the member states of the Council of Europe, domestic identity cards are
accepted in lieu of passports. Citizens of the Nordic states may even travel and reside through-
out the North without any papers at all.
29. P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (1956).
30. E. BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 493.
31. Although the French government does not insist that a person with dual citizenship,
where one of the citizenships is French, enter France only on the strength of his French pass-
port, once the person is in France his French passport is used as evidence that the person is a




Issuing or renewing a passport thus often amounts to an act of protec-
tion, as in the famous British case of William Joyce, known as "Lord
Haw Haw,' ' 32 which turned on the accused's possession of a British pass-
port. Joyce, an Irishman, falsely declared himself "a British subject by
birth," thus acquiring a British passport in 1933.33 The passport was
renewed for one year in 1938 and again in 1939. With the outbreak of
World War II, Joyce left Britain for Germany, where he gained notoriety
as an anti-British broadcaster. At the end of the war, he was arrested in
Germany and brought to trial in England for treason. The Crown con-
tended, and the court agreed, that anyone holding a British passport,
even if wrongfully acquired, owes allegiance to the Crown while the pass-
port remains valid, whether or not that person is physically present in the
United Kingdom. The court declared that by applying for and using a
British passport, an alien has clothed himself with the status of a British
subject. 34 Because possession of a British passport entitles the alien to
the protection of British consular offices, "protection draws
allegiance." 35
Because of their role in protection, passports can be important in de-
termining the status of refugees. 36 Possession of a passport may nega-
tively affect a refugee's status in international law. A refugee is, by
definition, unwilling or unable to avail himself of the protection of the
country of his nationality.37 If he "reavail[s] himself of the protection"
of his country, he ceases to be a refugee.38 Acquisition of a passport has
been considered adequate for "reavailing oneself of protection."
Some countries of refuge strictly apply two rules to passport acquisi-
tion by refugees. First, a person applying for refugee status must sur-
render his national passport. Second, a refugee who acquires a new
passport or renews an old one loses refugee status. Switzerland, in par-
ticular, has stressed these rules. Certain other countries apply them less
rigidly or not at all. For many years, Sweden required refugees to keep
and renew their passports, so that Swedish residence permits could be
protect him against the French government. Telephone interview with Jean-Claude Bouvard,
Deputy Consul and Chief of Chancellery, French Consulate of New York (Apr. 24, 1986).
32. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1946 A.C. 347 (H.L.).
33. Id. at 348-49.
34. The cburt stated that "the possession of a passport by one who is not a British subject
gives him rights and imposes upon the sovereign obligations which would otherwise not be
given or imposed." Id. at 369.
35. Id. at 366-68.
36. See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 379-92.
37. See, ag., Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. l(A)(2).
38. Id. art. I(C)(1).
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stamped in them.39 The Swedish practice, which has since been aban-
doned, proved problematic, as it forced refugees to maintain contact with
the consular agents of the regime from which they had fled. The Swiss
practice corresponds more closely to the intentions of the drafters of the
Convention on the Status of Refugees, and has since become the general
practice.4° While it does not lend itself to obvious criticism, it does not
address the intrinsic character of passports and their relation to protec-
tion in general. While the passport plays an important role in diplomatic
and consular protection, it is only a prima facie proof of citizenship. The
real test of citizenship in most states, including the United States, is
whether the bearer actually possesses the nationality of the state that
purports to protect him, and from whose protection he is not excluded
due to dual citizenship or refugee status. Just as the possession of a pass-
port is not sufficient for the exercise of active protection, it is also not
necessary. A state may protect a citizen whether he has no passport,
never possessed one, or even if he possesses a passport issued by some
other state or agency.
Nevertheless, there remains some merit to the view that a passport
represents a request, albeit tacit, to foreign governments that they treat
the bearer as the government of the issuing state would like to see its
citizens treated. If a passport is issued and recognized in this spirit, its
issuance may very well be considered a measure of protection. On the
other hand, if its purpose is merely to enable a person to comply with the
formal requirements of the alien and immigration laws of a particular
state, and if this is clearly understood by all concerned, the issuan'ce of
the passport will have little to do with protection in a more profound
sense. Instead, those involved will perceive it as merely a practical docu-
ment issued for practical purposes.41
II. Refugees as Unprotected Persons
The denial of diplomatic protection by one's country of origin is the
crucial characteristic of refugee status.42 When France passed a law re-
lating to foreign refugees in 1832,43 the French Garde des Sceaux ex-
plained in the National Assembly that refugees were foreigners staying in
39. See G. MELANDER, FLYKTINGAR OCH ASYL 140 (1972).
40. See Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. 1; Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. 1.
41. Sweden held this view at one time, although it is unclear how widespread the view is
currently. See G. MELANDER, supra note 39, at 151-52.
42. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.





France without a passport and without the protection of their own
governments. 44 The denial of protection by the refugee's country of ori-
gin appeared as a prominent criterion in all definitions of refugee adopted
between the two world wars. For example, a 1926 arrangement 45 defined
a Russian refugee as "[a]ny person of Russian origin who does not enjoy
or who no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the
[U.S.S.R.] and who has not acquired another nationality." 46 The defini-
tion, in an arrangement of 1928 of Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, and "as-
similated" refugees, 47 proposes the same idea in a more generalized form:
a refugee is one "who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protec-
tion of the State to which he previously belonged and who has not ac-
quired or does not possess another nationality. ' 48 Only the Plan for the
Issue of a Certificate of Identity to Refugees from the Saar of May 24,
44. 32 J. DUVERGIER, COLLECTION COMPLATE DES LoIs, DECRATS, ORDANNANCES,
REGLEMENTS ET Avis DU CONSEIL D'ETAT [Duv. & Boc.] 167 n.2 (1832) ("ceux qui, sans
passeport, sans relation avec aucune espine d'ambassadeur ... ."); 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN,
supra note 27, at 95. Note that this was two years after the 1830 revolution in France and a
year after a Polish uprising had been crushed by the Russians at Ostrolenka in 1831, which
caused many Poles to flee to France.
45. Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian
Refugees, May 12, 1929, 89 L.N.T.S. 47.
46. Id. at 49. An Armenian refugee was similarly defined in 1926 as "[a]ny person of
Armenian origin formerly a subject of the Ottoman Empire who does not enjoy or who no
longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the Turkish Republic and who has not
acquired another nationality." Id. See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 122-27. Note
that according to these definitions, a refugee from the Russian part of Armenia would qualify
as a "Russian," not as an "Armenian" refugee.
47. Arrangement Concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugees of Certain
Measures Taken in Favour of Russian and Armenian Refugees, June 30, 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. 65.
48. Id. at 65. See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 127-28. The definitions of
"Austrian refugees" and "refugees from Sudetenland" were basically designed in the same
way. See Refugees Coming from the Territory which Formerly Constituted Austria, June 4,
1938, 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 646; International Assistance to Refugees coming from
Territories Ceded by Czechoslovakia to Germany, Jan. 17, 1939, 20 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J.
72. See also Draft Protocol Proposed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Sept. 2, 1938, 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 678; Additional Protocol, July 14, 1939,
20 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 375; Additional Protocol, Sept. 14, 1939, 198 L.N.T.S. 141. The
Convention Concerning Refugees Coming from Germany propounded the traditional
definition:
a) persons possessing or having possessed German nationality and not possessing any
other nationality who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the protection of the
German Government;
b) Stateless persons not covered by previous Conventions or Agreements who have
left German territory after being established therein and who are proved not to enjoy, in
law or in fact, the protection of the German Government.
Convention Concerning Refugees Coming from Germany, Feb. 10, 1938, 192 L.N.T.S. 59, 63
[hereinafter cited as 1938 Convention]. The definition also contained the provision that
"[p]ersons who leave Germany for reasons of purely personal convenience are not included in
this definition." Id. A post-war French decree similarly defined Spanish refugees. Decree No.
45-766, Mar. 15, 1945, 1945 Journal Officiel de la R~publique Frangaise [J.O.] 2254, cited in 1
A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 131.
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193549 contains no direct reference to the denial of state protection as a
requirement for refugee status. The implication is the same, however,
since the conditions for recognition as Saar refugees were that, "having
previously had the status of inhabitants of the Saar, [they] have left the
territory on the occasion of the plebiscite and are not in possession of
national passports."50
The Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO)51
created definitions of "refugee" and "displaced person" for a specific pur-
pose-to determine eligibility for the services of that organization.5 2 The
IRO definition of "refugee" includes all persons who were considered
refugees before the outbreak of World War II, but there is no explicit
reference to a denial of state protection. However, the notion of "vic-
tinos" of a given regime, a forerunner of the notion of "persecution,"
appears here as a criterion of refugee status.53
The requirements of a "well-founded fear of persecution" and a denial
of state protection are combined in paragraph 6 of the UNHCR Statute,
which defines the High Commissioner's competence ratione personae,54
and again in Article l(A)(2) of the Convention on the Status of Refu-
gees. 55 Both instruments make it a condition of refugee eligibility that
the person in question be "unable or. . .unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of [the country of his nationality]. '56 For stateless persons,
* this condition is supplanted by the requirement that such person be "un-
49. 16 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.L 1681 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Plan for Refugees from
the Saar].
50. Id. By a plebiscite under the supervision of the League of Nations, a great majority of
the inhabitants of the Saarland had opted for integration into Germany. Until the plebiscite,
the Saar territory had been provisionally administered by an international commission under
the Treaty of Versailles. See Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, part III, annex to
arts. 45-50, chs. II-III. The refugees were those who left the territory either because they did
not want to become German nationals or because they feared the Nazi regime established in
Germany. French citizens could qualify for French passports and consequently were not in-
cluded in the definition. See I A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 132.
51. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, opened for signature Dec. 15,
1946, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as IRO Constitution].
52. This is how the word "eligibility" came into refugee law parlance. We now speak
about "eligibility" for refugee status, which may sound peculiar if one does not know the
historical origin of the word.
53. See IRO Constitution, supra note 51, part 1, see. A. See also 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN,
supra note 27, at 134-35.
54. See supra note 5. Exclusion clauses are contained in paragraph 7 of the UNHCR
Statute.
55. See supra note 4. Article I(A)(1) relates to "statutory refugees," meaning refugees
according to previous international instruments. Id.
56. Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. I(A)(2). See also I A. GRAHL-




able or . . . unwilling to return [to the country of his former habitual
residence]." '57
According to these modern definitions, unwillingness to avail oneself
of protection must stem from a well-founded fear of persecution based on
race, religion, national origin, membership in a social group, or political
opinion.58 Inability to avail oneself of protection is not subject to such a
proviso. However, since a refugee must be outside his country of origin
because he fears his fate there, the criterion of inability to avail oneself of
protection incorporates the notion of persecution. A person may be un-
able to avail himself of protection for the following reasons:
-protection may be refused expressly or tacitly, as when a passport is
denied or even cancelled;
-the government of the country of origin may not be recognized by
the government of the country of refuge; and59
-the two countries may be at war with each other.60
Denial of protection thus proved to be the distinguishing feature of the
earliest definitions of "refugee." These definitions were ad hoc in nature
and applied to persons who had left specific countries as a result of polit-
ical upheavals and repressive governmental policies. Since the interna-
tional community was generally aware of repression in such countries, it
was unnecessary to expound on this denial of protection in the defini-
tions. The salient point was that the person concerned was not in good
standing with the new government of his home country, and the concept
of denial of protection came to express this idea. However, the gener-
alized definition of refugee in the post-World War II instruments failed
to explain why persons would be outside their country of origin. Hence,
the notion of well-founded fear of persecution for certain enumerated
57. Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. l(A)(2).
58. Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. l(A)(2); UNHCR Statute,
supra note 5, para. 6(A)(ii).
59. In discussing the situation of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, Hambro maintains that
most were not unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the Taiwan government,
which at the time occupied the Chinese seat at the U.N. E. HAMBRO, THE PROBLEM OF
CHINESE REFUGEES IN HONG KONG 35 (1955). However, he overlooks the fact that, because
of the British government's shift of recognition from the Taiwan to the Chinese government,
these refugees were unable to avail themselves of such protection. See also 1 A. GRAHL-MAD-
SEN, supra note 27, at 258-59.
60. There are additional but less relevant reasons for lack of protection. The actual means
of providing protection may be lacking, as when diplomatic relations or consular services are
lacking. Yet, usually, if the person desires protection, the government is willing to provide it,
and it has the physical means for doing so, it is hard to envisage the person in question as a
refugee. See Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. I(C)(1); see also 1 A.
GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 27, at 379-81.
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reasons evolved and supplemented the time-honored notion of denial of
protection.
The stipulation in the various definitions that a denial of state protec-
tion constitutes a criterion of refugee status has given rise to the notion of
"unprotected persons," persons without traditional or customary diplo-
matic and consular protection. Stateless persons have been categorized
as "de jure unprotected persons," as distinguished from "de facto unpro-
tected persons, ' 61 who are refugees formally possessing the nationality of
their country of origin. However, the designation of refugees as de facto
unprotected persons begs the question of whether the country of origin
has a right in international law to protect those nationals who have left
the country as refugees. If this critical question is answered in the nega-
tive, refugees, whether stateless or formally possessing a nationality, are
truly de jure unprotected persons, and to identify them as merely de facto
unprotected persons would be misleading.62
The definitions of "refugee" in the 1920's spoke merely of a denial of
state protection, but definitions adopted throughout the 1930's concern-
ing German, Austrian, and Spanish refugees added to that requirement
the words "in law or in fact."'63 The reason for introducing this distinc-
tion between de jure and de facto lack of protection remains unclear.
Apparently the phrase "in law or in fact" was no more than a cautious
addition to prevent persons from being denied refugee status on the basis
of a theoretical argument as to whether their lack of protection was le-
gally or merely factually based.64 Neither the UNHCR Statute nor the
Convention on the Status of Refugees addresses this question. 65 Rather,
these conventions emphasize the situation and attitude of the individual:
he may be recognized as a refugee if he is unwilling or unable to avail
himself of the protection of the country of his nationality. The modern
conception of refugee status has thus helped terminate the obsolete and
61. See Weis, Legal Aspects of the Convention of 25 July 1951 Relating to the Status of
Refugees, 30 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 480 (1953); 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 96.
62. See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 97-101.
63. See, e.g., 1938 Convention, supra note 48, art. I(l)(a).
64. The distinction could have come from the view that a person being denationalized was
considered unprotected in law, whereas those refugees who had formally retained their nation-
ality were considered unprotected in fact. Yet, this explanation is contradicted by the fact that
the "in law or in fact" expression is used in the 1938 Convention, supra note 48, not only with
respect to "persons possessing or having possessed German nationality," but also to "stateless
persons," apparently including such stateless persons who never possessed German national-
ity. Id. art. I(1)(a)-(b). It is neither warranted nor decisive to read any particular construction
into the distinction with respect to the right exercised by the country of origin in the 1938
Convention and the 1939 Protocol. Additional Protocol, opened for signature Sept. 14, 1939,
198 L.N.T.S. 141.




merely theoretical difference between de facto and de jure protected
persons.
Indeed, both early refugee groups and post-war refugees share the ex-
perience of the disruption or non-existence of the normal bond of trust
and allegiance between citizen and government, leaving a relationship of
fear and alienation. Such disruption transcends the label de jure or de
facto. As Kimminich first pointed out, a politically motivated breach of
the bond between government and individual defines the latter as a refu-
gee.66 The denial of state protection is actually a symbol or a manner of
speech to describe the broken bond. Denial of protection is, in fact, a
symptom rather than the disease itself.
III. The Role of Customary Protection in International Law
A. The Link Between Nationality and Protection
Public international law recognizes that the question of a person's sta-
tus as a national or citizen 67 of a given state should be determined ac-
cording to the laws of that state.68 As nationality laws vary considerably
from state to state and no agreement on any general international con-
vention with respect to nationality has yet been reached, some persons
may be considered nationals of two or more states, while others may not
qualify as nationals of any state.69
Refugees may be stateless or they may have retained their formal na-
tionality.70 In some cases, ascertaining nationality may be difficult. For
example, the government of the Soviet Union refused to consider as
66. 0. KIMMINICH, DER INTERNATIONALE RECHTSSTATUS DES FLOCHTLINGS 33-48
(1962).
67. The words "national," "subject," and "citizen" are used synonymously here, meaning
a person possessing the nationality (citizenship) of a particular State. Additionally, it is not
essential to make a distinction between "citizens" and so-called "protected persons" or "res-
sortissants." See generally P. WEIS, supra note 29, at 3-7; 1 L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUTER-
PACHT, supra note 15, at 644-45.
68. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws,
Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter cited as Convention on Conflict of Nationality
Laws]. Article 1 provides that "[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are
its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with
international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised
with regard to nationality." Id. at 99. See P. WEis, supra note 29, at 65; 1 L. OPPENHEIM &
H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 15, at 642-43.
69. See I L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 15, at 664-65; P. WEis, supra
note 29, at 165; Convention on Stateless Persons, supra note 28, art. 1(1) ("For the purpose of
this Convention, the term 'stateless person' means a person who is not considered as a national
by any State under the operation of its law.").
70. See UNHCR Statute, supra note 5, para. 6(A)(ii); Convention on Status of Refugees,
supra note 4, art. I(A)(2); Lov om utlendingers adgang til riket m. v. (Norwegian Aliens Act),
§ 2, July 27, 1956.
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Soviet citizens those refugees who fled the country following the Russian
revolution.71 However, the U.S.S.R. strongly maintained that persons
"displaced" during and after World War II were Soviet citizens requiring
repatriation. Generally, refugees in the post-war period are considered to
possess the formal nationality of their country of origin. Their children
born abroad will often be awarded "uncertain" or "undecided" status. 72
Thus, to say that a refugee is a national of his country of origin 73 simply
means that he is considered a national according to its laws. In relation
to that country, he may have, at least nominally, such rights and duties
as its municipal law attaches to the possession of its nationality or citi-
zenship.74 Such a status could result in serious domestic consequences if
he ever returns or otherwise falls into the hands of authorities of that
country, as, for example, during a military occupation.75 The legal rela-
tionship between the state and its nationals is a complex municipal law
issue, particularly since the relationship differs from country to country.
In international law, nationality has two major effects: a state may
protect its nationals vis-A-vis other states, and it has a duty to readmit
them to its territory should another state decide to expel them.76 Com-
missioner Nielsen in the Naomi Russell Case77 aptly stated that
"[n]ationality is the justification in international law for the intervention
of one government to protect persons and property in another coun-
try."' 78 While nationality is not always necessary or sufficient for protec-
71. See Raestad, Statslptosepersoner og deres rettsstilling, 5 NORDISK TIDssKRIFr FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL RET 177, 185 (1934).
72. Id. at 182 (Norwegian Law of Aug. 8, 1924, § 9).
73. The term "country of origin" denotes the country outside of which a refugee is staying
owing to fear of persecution. As far as refugees formally possessing a nationality are con-
cerned, it means the same as "country of nationality." It comprises the terms "country of
nationality" and "country of former habitual residence" used in para. 6(A)(ii) of the UNHCR
Statute, supra note 5, and art.l(A)(2) of the Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4.
74. For example:
nationality has had general relevance in the law of the United Kingdom in connection
only with the enjoyment of political rights, the extent of criminal jurisdiction, the right of
residence within the dominions of the Crown, the right to practise certain callings, and
the right to own certain categories of property-in modern days, British ships, formerly
English land.
Parry, The Duty to Recognise Foreign Nationality Laws, 19 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES
OFFENTLICHES REcwrr 337, 338-39 (1958) (citations omitted).
75. Apart from these municipal or domestic effects, the bond of nationality normally also
has certain effects in international law. See infra text accompanying notes 77-91. See also P.
WEis, supra note 29, at 31-35; H. VAN PANHUYs, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 24-31 (1959).
76. See I L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 15, at 645-46; P. WEIS, supra
note 29, at 35-60.
77. U.S. v. Mex., United States and Mexican Claims Comm'n 5, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
805 (1931).




tion, Commissioner Nielsen's statement gives the general rule that
applies in the vast majority of cases where states exercise diplomatic or
consular protection. 79
The duty of a state to readmit one of its nationals at the request of
another state8o is a corollary to the right of protection. For example, in
Young v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,81 the appellants, refugees from
the People's Republic of China, had been given passports in Taiwan from
the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. However, those
passports did not entitle the holders to enter Taiwan. The court found
that the appellants did not enjoy the full protection of that government as
outlined in the Convention on the Status of Refugees, and were thus enti-
tled to refugee status.82
Two approaches to determining whether a person is a national of a
state have emerged. One approach defines a national in terms of legal
relations between states, as a person to whom the state possesses the right
of protection and owes the duty of admission with respect to other
states.83 The American commissioner in Laurent's Case84 reflected this
view when he stated that "we are not to look to the Statutes of England
for the definition of the term subjects, but to the settled practice and us-
ages of nations. 85 This internationally-based definition creates a risk of
circular reasoning blurring the issues. If the right of protection does not
apply to a given person, then that person is, by definition, not a "na-
tional" of the state in question.
The second approach, applied by the International Court of Justice in
the Nottebohm Case,86 defines the term "nationality" with reference to a
state's domestic law. This usage also conforms to the terminology used
79. The rule laid down by Commissioner Nielsen "reflects the facts but imperfectly."
Parry, Some Considerations upon the Protection of Individuals in International Law, 90
RECUEIL DES CouRs 653, 704 (1956); H. VAN PANHUYS, supra note 75, at 204.
80. See P. WEIs, supra note 29, at 49-60.
81. BVerwG IC 138.60, Mar. 23, 1964, cited in 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at
191-92, 260.
82. See supra note 4. See also 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 191.
83. So at least it seems in P. WEis, supra note 29, at 61:
Nationality in the sense of international law is a technical term denoting the allocation of
individuals, termed nationals, to a specific State-the State of nationality-as members of
that State, a relationship which confers upon the State of nationality the above-mentioned
rights and duties in relation to other States.
On the other hand, Weis does not consider proteges and alien seamen to be nationals,
although they may enjoy diplomatic protection. Id. at 42-44.
84. U.S. v. Gr. Brit., United States and Great Britain Comm'n for the Settlement of
Claims, Rep. of Decisions 120 (1856).
85. Id. at 144 (emphasis in original).
86. 1955 I.C.J. 4, 20-21 (Second Phase Judgment of Apr. 6).
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in the Convention on Stateless Persons.8 7 Therefore, nationality is de-
fined in domestic terms as an offshoot of municipal law and in interna-
tional terms as conferring the right of protection88 and the duty of
admission.89
The right of protection and the duty of admission pertain to certain
categories of persons and not to others. By examining the concept of
nationals as defined by states, an understanding of more marginal groups
can evolve-groups like "protected persons" or '"protigs,"90 American
Indians, "Germans" as defined by article 116(1) of the 1949 German
Grundgesetz,91 ships' crews, resident stateless persons, and, of central im-
portance for the present study, various categories of refugees and dis-
placed persons.
B. The Right of States to Protect Individuals
The right of a state to protect a person has as its corollary the obliga-
tion on the part of other states to accept such protection as lawful. This
right and accompanying obligation extend beyond the protection of citi-
zens, to certain classes of individuals who are not citizens of the
protecting state. For example, this includes the well-known class of
"British protected persons." z92 Moreover, a flag state may protect a
ship's crew irrespective of the nationality of individual crew members.93
On the other hand, residence or even domicile in the territory of a given
state does not, as international law stands today, independently bestow
any right of protection. 94 Stateless persons do not normally enjoy the
diplomatic or consular protection of the state in which they reside, ex-
cept in those rare instances where they are accorded protection as mem-
87. See Convention on Stateless Persons, supra note 28, art. 1(1).
88. See C. PARRY, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
AND OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 11 (1957).
89. See generally P. WEIS, supra note 29.
90. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 15, at 646-47.
91. See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 267-69.
92. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 130-31 (1957); see also L. LEE,
CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 117-18 (1961).
93. See P. WEIS, supra note 29, at 43; see also R. BARBIER, L'INTERVENTION DIPLOMA-
TIQUE D'UN ETAT POUR LE PROTECTION DES DROITS DE SON NATIONAL RESIDENT A
L'ETRANGER 98 (1935); E. BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 475-78; and the critical view expressed
in 1 0. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 593-94. See also Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
94. See E. BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 555-59; C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1928); H. EEK, OM FRAMLINOSKAP 101-02 (1955); 3
J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 276-82, 757-71, 790-95 (1906); C. PARRY,
supra note 88, at 699.
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Protection of Refugees
bers of ships' crews or of armed forces travelling abroad.95 The ability of
a citizen to forfeit his right to be protected, and the possibility of a state
forfeiting its right to protect one of its nationals through expatriation or
by waiver of international reclamation, 96 remain contentious issues.
Even the possession of nationality does not guarantee that a state may
exercise its protection. For instance, in cases of dual or multiple nation-
ality, traditionally only one of the states whose nationality the individual
possesses may extend protection, while the others may not. In the Not-
tebohm Case,97 the International Court of Justice stressed that national-
ity acquired through naturalization need only be recognized by other
states if "the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's genu-
ine connection with the State." 98 The Court subscribed to the theory
that "nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attach-
ment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, to-
gether with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties." Nationality
only entitles a "State to exercise protection vis-A-vis another State, if it
constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individual's connec-
tion with the State." 99 The Court applied this theory to a case of nation-
ality acquired by naturalization, 100 but the theory may be capable of
broader application.
C. The Right of States to Protect Exiled Nationals:
The Traditional View
A state may not impose its nationality on aliens living in its territory
against their will, thereby robbing their country of origin of its right of
protection. A state may, however, impose its nationality on foreigners
who accept certain official or governmental positions, as well as on per-
sons who marry its nationals. These aliens either lose their original na-
tionality or become dual nationals. In both cases, they become subject to
the rule expressed in the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to
the Conflict of Nationality Laws, which requires that "[a] State may not
95. See H. VAN PANHUYS, supra note 75, at 72; U.N. Economic and Social Council, A
Study of Statelessness 32-33, U.N. Doc. E/i112 (1949); R. BARBIER, supra note 93, at 84.
Note that protection of members of armed forces may be viewed from the perspective of state
immunity.
96. See C. EAGLETON, supra note 94, at 168 (discussion of "Calvo clauses").
97. Liecht. v. Guat., 1953 I.C.J. 7 (Order of Mar. 21); 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Second Phase Judg-
ment of Apr. 6).
98. 1955 I.C.J. at 23.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 24-26.
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afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose
nationality such person also possesses." 101
Prolonged residence in a foreign country may deprive an individual of
the "genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments" to which
the International Court of Justice referred in the Nottebohm Case.102
This is particularly true in the case of persons born abroad who have
never resided in, nor perhaps even visited, the country of which they are
nationals. For this reason, the nationality laws of certain states provide
for the forfeiture of nationality of that state if the person fails to visit for
a given number of years or when he reaches a certain age. However,
notwithstanding such provisions, most states have been reluctant to give
up their right to protect nationals even when these nationals have resided
abroad for many years.
Nottebohm expressed the traditionally held position that "by taking up
the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality as-
serting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law."' 10 3 According to this theory, it
would seem obvious that a national may not deny a state its right of
protection by a waiver of "international reclamation." Yet denying the
national the right to waive protection may have dangerous repercussions
on the individual involved. Hilding Eek describes incidents of aliens ar-
riving in Sweden and asking for asylum, whereupon their country of ori-
gin, attempting to force repatriation, took action vis-A-vis the Swedish
police and immigration authorities in order to "protect" the refugees.
Under current practice, such action is usually fruitless, causing the asy-
lum-seeker no inconvenience. Eek argues, however, that because the
right of protection-jus protectionis-regulates only the relationship be-
tween states, the desires of individuals should, in principle, be irrelevant.
He concludes that intervention by the state of a refugee's nationality on
his behalf cannot be rejected as illegitimate under international law. 104
Walter Schfitzel makes the same general argument, but modifies it with
regard to states that have ratified the Convention on the Status of Refu-
gees, because these states "have thus recognized the international status
101. Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra note 68, art. 4.
102. 1955 I.C.J. at 23.
103. 1955 I.C.J. at 24.
104. H. EEK, supra note 94, at 67-68, 70. In disregarding "the desires of individuals" ("in-
dividernas onskemal', Bek overlooks the fact that the "desires" have become manifest by the




of refugees." 10 5 Schitzel's exception has some significance in cases where
both the country of origin and the country of refuge are parties to the
Convention. Yet it would be difficult to apply it between a party state
and a non-party state. Nonetheless, because the "international status of
refugees" has its roots in general international law, a state's status as a
party to the Convention should not be determinative of the state's right
to provide protection.
Eek's and Schitzel's argument imperfectly restates the position of in-
ternational law. By accepting public office in a foreign land, by marrying
a foreigner, or by applying for or consenting to naturalization by another
state, an individual frustrates or even terminates the right of protection
of his country of origin. This is especially true when the individual ac-
quires a new nationality, either automatically, by operation of law, or as
a result of a governmental act. Similarly, an application for asylum or
refugee status is not merely an expression of a desire, but is a definite
legal step that may result in the granting of asylum or refugee status. If
granted, such status resembles acquisition of a new nationality. Under
these circumstances, Eek's and Schitzel's lines of reasoning lose their
persuasiveness because their distinctions lose relevance.
Luke Lee discusses a state's right to deny the right of protection to a
home state when a national wishes to waive that protection. He ex-
presses the view that "States are generally loath to see aliens subjected to
involuntary protection by consuls . . . Thus, where consuls or other
officials of the sending State have concerned themselves with reluctant
nationals . . . their assertion of jurisdiction has frequently met with re-
buffs from the receiving States."' 10 6 In this context, Lee mentions the
following provision of the Third Protocol of Signature to the United
Kingdom-Swedish Consular Convention (1952):
The High Contracting Parties wish to place on record that, in their view, it
is within the discretion of any state not to recognize the right of a consular
officer of another state to act on behalf of, or otherwise concern himself
with any national of the latter state who has become a political refugee.107
105. See W. SCHXTZEL & T. VELTER, HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN FLOCHTLING-
SRECHTS 137 (1960).
106. L. Lee, supra note 92, at 120.
107. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.25/13/Add.1, quoted in L. LEE, supra note 92, at 120. See also
Grahl-Madsen, Wiener-Konvensjonen om Konsulaere forbindelser av 24 April 1963, 34
NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 301, 308-309 (1964); 1 E. DE VATTEL, LE
DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX
AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS chap. XIX, § 226 (London 1758).
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This rule is reiterated in the Protocol to the European Convention on
Consular Functions.108 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
uses more guarded language. Article 36 stipulates only that a consul
may not concern himself with a national of the sending state who has
been arrested, imprisoned, or detained in the receiving state, and who
expressly opposes such intervention. 10 9
The Vienna Conference on Consular Relations did not resolve the
problem of whether a state has the right to protect its nationals who have
since become refugees. Instead, the matter was referred to "the appro-
priate organs of the United Nations."' 10 Upon referral, it was deter-
mined that a state had no such right. 1' Yet, neither the Economic and
Social Council nor the General Assembly has dealt with this problem.
Insofar as general international law is concerned, the issue remains un-
resolved. However, before squarely addressing the right of a state to pro-
tect nationals who have become refugees, a historical detour is necessary.
IV. The Evolution of the Concepts of Nationality and
Diplomatic Protection
A. Historical Perceptions of the Bond Between Sovereign
and Individual
Nationality in the modern sense, and formal nationality as a justifica-
tion for state protection, are fairly recent conceptual developments.
Their importance can best be understood from an historical perspective.
In ancient Greece and Rome, citizenship was based on the principle of
jus sanguinis; it was acquired at birth and depended on parentage. In
feudal Europe, where territorial bonds were stronger than blood ties, the
principle of jus soli-acquisition of nationality by place of birth-
108. Protocol to the European Convention on Consular Functions Concerning the Protec-
tion of Refugees, Dec. 11, 1967, Europ. T.S. No. 61, at 30.
109. See supra note 12. Several modem consular conventions provide that authorities of a
receiving state shall not be obliged to return a seaman to a ship if "there is reasonable ground
for believing that his life or liberty will be endangered, for reasons of race, nationality, political
opinion or religion, in any country to which the vessel is likely to go." Consular Convention,
Feb. 22, 1951, United Kingdom-Norway, art. 26(5)(b)(ii), 326 U.N.T.S. 209, 246. See also L.
LEE, supra note 92, at 94-96. This provision may, of course, be construed as a supplement to
the rule of non-refoulement which prohibits the forcible return of a refugee to a country in
which he risks persecution. See Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. 33; 2 A.
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 1, at 93-98. The fact that this provision is found in a consular
convention suggests a certain limitation as to the right of a consul, and hence of a sending
state, to concern itself with crew members, including nationals of the sending state, who claim
to be refugees.






emerged as the determinant of citizenship. As the feudal system in Eu-
rope broke down, residence became the single most important factor in
determining the relationship between the individual and the state. 112
Developments within the United Kingdom took a somewhat different
turn. In England, birth "within the allegiance" of the Crown was long
considered the distinguishing characteristic of subjects as opposed to
aliens.'1 3 At the same time, the British also developed the doctrine of
"perpetual allegiance,"' 14 which made them reluctant to assimilate
aliens. Parliament eventually won a struggle with the Crown for control
over the naturalization process, and a naturalization case appears in the
Rolls of Parliament as early as 1295, followed by many more over the
centuries." 5 The courts upheld the requirement that one be a natural-
born British subject in order to enjoy certain civil rights such as the right
to hold land. 16 In this context, the English doctrine of perpetual alle-
giance was closely linked to the concept of domicile, particularly in its
emphasis on the domicile of origin. 117 Yet domicile has never been the
legal basis of British nationality. 1 8 The development of the concept of
112. In Norway and the free cities of continental Europe which lacked a feudal system,
habitual residence formed the basic link between the individual and the res publica. Thus,
King Christian V's Norwegian Code stipulated that anyone who lived or owned a residence
within the King's realms and lands, but no others, were the King's subjects and owed him
allegiance. Kong Christian Den Femtis Norske Lay, Book I, chap. 1, art. 5 (1687), 1682-1957
NORGES LOVER 3. The Norwegian Constitution, the oldest written European constitution still
in force, used the terms "subject of the State" ("Statens Undersaat"). See, e.g., GRUNDLOV
§ 92 (Nor. 1814). This term was chosen because the term "the King's subject" would also
denote inhabitants of Denmark and of the duchies of Slesvig, Holstein and Lauenburg. "Nor-
wegian citizen" has been used since May 17, 1814, to refer to persons residing in the country,
with the following limitations on the rights of citizenship: the right to vote is subject to five
years residence (§ 50); the right to be appointed to public office is reserved for natural-born
citizens, persons who have lived in the country for ten years, or persons naturalized by the
Storting (Parliament) (§ 92); and the right to be elected member of the Storting requires ten
years residence (§ 61).
The United States and Great Britain similarly limit the rights of citizens based on residence;
the corresponding provisions of the United States Constitution, art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and art. I, § 3,
cl. 3, stipulate that a Representative or a Senator must have been a citizen of the United States
for seven or nine years, respectively. The British rule, absent a written constitution, holds that
naturalization is the prerogative of Parliament. Residence remained the basis for Norwegian
nationality until 1888, when birth became as important as residence. See Law Relating to
Norwegian State-Citizenship etc., Apr. 21, 1888, in 1814-1953 COMPILATION OF NORWEGIAN
LAWS ETC. 29 (1956).
113. See C. PARRY, supra note 88, at 30-34. Allegiance and territorial jurisdiction were
not completely coextensive.
114. Id. at 32-34, 78.
115. Id. at 34-40.
116. This is demonstrated by Calvin's Case, 2 St. Tr. 559 (1608), cited in C. PARRY, supra
note 88, at 5-7.
117. C. PARRY, supra note 88, at 4 n.6.
118. Cf. id. at 4 ("In common law countries, of course, civil status has at no time been
made dependent upon nationality.").
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nationality in the British Isles thus differs from that in continental Euro-
pean countries.
B. The Beginnings of Nationality Legislation
The trend toward nationality in the modem sense started in the young
and expansive American states. The Articles of Confederation contained
the interesting provision that "the free inhabitants of each of these States,
paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several
States."119 This provision clearly implies that residence was considered
sufficient for a claim to U.S. citizenship. Nevertheless, the states contin-
ued to follow a practice developed under British colonial rule of passing
naturalization laws and granting naturalization effective only in the
particular colony in question. 120 James Madison strongly criticized arti-
cle IV on the basis that it made p6ssible a situation where "in one State,
residence for a short term confirms all the rights of citizenship; in an-
other, qualifications of greater importance are required." 121 For this rea-
son, the 1787 Constitution gave Congress the power "to establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization."' 122 With the passing of the first Natu-
ralization Act in 1790, the foundation was laid for the formalization of
U.S. citizenship status based on a set period of residence.123
119. ART. OF CONFED. art. 4 (1776).
120. See generally C. PARRY, supra note 88, at 439-52, 523-33, 606-12, 657-70, 746-50,
788-97, 836-57, 883-89, 925-43 (nationality laws of various Commonwealth countries).
121. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 291-92 (J. Madison) (M. Dunne ed. 1901).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. A rule similar to the one in article IV of the Articles of
Confederation was included in the Constitution: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. It is
interesting to note that the word "inhabitants" used in the Articles of Confederation has been
superseded by the word "citizens." Interesting also is U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1: "The
Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper
to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars
for every Person."
123. An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, I Stat. III (1790). The act
laid down the rule, subject to certain qualifications, "[t]hat any alien, being a free white person,
who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the
term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof, on application to any common
law court of record . . . . " Id. It is interesting to note that chapter II of the same statute,
approved on March 1, 1790, provided for the enumeration of the inhabitants of the United
States. 1 Stat. 11 (1790). The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, which entered into
force on July 28, 1868, contained the provision that "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the States wherein they reside." It is generally agreed, however, that the amendment only
stated the existing law, as far as the principle ofjus soli is concerned, and that its primary
purpose was to admit blacks to citizenship. See C. GE'rrvs, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN
THE UNITED STATES 11-12 (1934).
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In Europe, two different approaches were taken in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries to defining citizenship rights. In some
monarchies, only natural-born subjects and assimilated persons had the
right to hold public office. 124 Countries more heavily influenced by the
American and French revolutions created additional regulations
governing membership in the political community. In passing its civil
code, France became the first major European country to supplement the
principle of residence by establishingjus sanguinis as an additional basis
for citizenship. 125 The French enactments were a notable exception to
the continental European rule. Residence remained the basis for nation-
ality in continental Europe until the middle of the nineteenth century,
and even later than that in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. 126
124. Typical of nationality laws in this category is a law signed on January 15, 1776 by
King Christian VII of Denmark-Norway, entitled The Law of Indigenousness, according to
which "appointment to public office in his majesty's realms and lands is reserved for natural-
born subjects and persons assimilated to them." ("Indfgods-Retten, hvorefter Adgang til Em-
beder i Hans Majestaets Riger og Landeforbeholdes alene de indf9odte Undersaatter, og dem,
som derved lige agtes.") KONGERIGET DANMARKs LOVE 100 (H. Federspiel ed. 1910). The
law drew a distinction between natural-born subjects and others, but only with regard to ap-
pointment to public office. While the conditions for naturalization were very strict, non-natu-
ralized immigrants were also considered to be the King's subjects. Their children born within
"The King's Realms and Lands" were full-fledged natural-born subjects under article 9 of the
Law. The right of indigenousness applied to all persons born in the Kingdoms of Denmark
and Norway, which also entailed the Faroes, Iceland, Greenland, and the Danish West-Indian
Islands, as well as the duchies of Slesvig, Holstein and Lauenburg, provided only that the
territory belonged to the monarchy. It applied also to children of subjects who were outside
the territory on journeys or in the King's service.
125. While the French Constitution of September 14, 1791 had defined French citizenship
on the basis ofjus soli alone, the civil code completely changed those provisions. CODE CIVIL
[C. CIV.], Code de la Nationalit6 arts. 17, 19, 44 (1981). For a long time, certain Italian cities
had rules similarly regulating the possession of citizenship. Rules establishing a Helvetian
citizenship were included in the Constitution of the Helvetian Republic, imposed on the Swiss
Cantons in 1798, but they lost their importance as the Helvetian Republic collapsed. In
France, the civil code was followed by a Decree of March 12, 1809 which instituted a naturali-
zation procedure. See R. FLOURNOY & M. HUDSON, NATIONALITY LAWS 241-42 (1929).
126. In tracing the historical developments, dates are sufficient to tell the tale. The princi-
ple ofjus sanguinis was contained in § 28 of the Austrian Civil Code, (Allgemeines BUrger-
liches Gesetzbuch of 1811 [hereinafter cited as ABGB]), but § 29 stated that Austrian
nationality was acquired by 10 years of residence in the country, by appointment to public
office, or by the commencement of a business that necessitated the habitual residence in the
country. See ABGB §§ 30, 32. Sections 29-32 were amended by laws Nr. 108/1860 and Nr.
285/1925. The Austrian Civil Code was followed by similar enactments in the Norwegian
Constitution of 1814, § 92, and the Bavarian Edikt iber das Indigenat (1818), reprinted in R.
PILOTY & C. SUTNER, DIE VERFALLUNGSURKUNDE DES K6NIGREICHS BAYERN (1907). "
A new wave of nationality legislation occurred about twenty years later. Nationality in the
Netherlands was established in the "Btirgerlyk Wetboek" (1838). The Belgian Constitution of
1831 re-established the civil code. Nationality laws for certain classes were passed in 1835 and
1839. See R. FLOURNOY & M. HUDSON, supra note 125, at 27. With regard to the Nether-
lands, see id. at 440. Prussia enacted the Gesetz Uiber den Erwerbung und den Verlust der
Eigenschaft als preussischer Unterthan (1842), GESETZ-SAMMLUNG FOR DIE KONIGLICHEN
PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN, No. 2319 (1843), the first law to provide for a separate official action
as one condition for the release from nationality (§§ 15-26). See W. SCHXTZEL & T. VEITER,
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C. Development of Diplomatic Protection-Eighteenth Century
to the Present
The emergence of diplomatic protection of nationals as an important
legal concept stems from both the revolutionary development of interna-
tional travel and the passage of early nationality and naturalization laws.
It gained considerable momentum with the negotiation of the Jay
Treaty127 between the United Kingdom and the United States. When
continental European states in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centu-
ries protected their nationals, they protected persons habitually residing
in the territory of the claimant state. This practice may explain why "a
certain hesitation was formerly shown as to whether the basis of the right
of protection was not domicile rather than nationality." 128 Even in Brit-
ish and American protection practice, residence played a major role. In
1844, the Queen's Advocate advised the government that the United
Kingdom had the right to protect a foreign-born, non-naturalized
merchant who had married an English woman and fathered children
born in England, against the government of a foreign state that was not
his country of origin. 129 The United States-British Claims Commission
of 1853 also made noteworthy decisions along these lines.' 30 The Con-
supra note 105, at 133. The first law on German federal nationality to have practical implica-
tions was the North-German Federal Gesetz iiber den Erwerb and Verlust der Reichs-und
Staats-angehfrigkeit (1870), modelled on the Prussian law of 1842 and, like its forerunner,
based on the principle ofjussanguinis. Russian nationality was regulated in a law of 1864, and
Italian nationality in the Code of 1865, CODICE CIVILE [C. c.] art. 4. In 1867 the Austrian
Civil Code was amended to tighten considerably the rules for acquisition and loss of Austrian
nationality. The first British naturalization act was passed in 1844; a new one appeared in
1870. See C. PARRY, supra note 88, at 65-71.
In 1888 Norway passed its first nationality law which substitutedjus sanguinis for residence.
The degree of foreign influence on the Norwegian Nationality Act of 1888 is evident in its
reintroduction of the term "subject" into Norwegian nationality law, as though this were a
recognized legal term: "A Norwegian citizen is a Norwegian subject." Law Relating to Nor-
wegian State-Citizenship etc., supra note 112, § 7, para. 3. Also, "[tjhose inhabitants of the
country not possessing the rights of Norwegian state-citizens are not Norwegian subjects." Id.
§ 8, para. 1. For details about the law, see E. DONs, NORSK STATSBORGERRETT 26-28 (1947);
E. HAMBRO, NORSK FREMMEDRETT 72-79 (1950). Laws similar in scope were passed in
Scandinavian countries, including Sweden, in the late nineteenth century, see E. HAMBRO,
supra, at 27-28.
127. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, (United States-United
Kingdom), 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105. Under the treaty, each side agreed to compensate nation-
als of the opposite country, pursuant to claims made to a joint claims commission, for losses
suffered during the war. Id. arts. VI-VII.
128. C. PARRY, supra note 88, at 12. It may also explain Earl Russell's instruction to Sir
J. Crampton of July 9, 1862, 25 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 696 (1868-69), which in that case
would not appear as exceptional as it otherwise might.
129. Report of the Queen's Advocate (May 15, 1844) (F.O. 83/2341).
130. Cases include Laurent's Case (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), United States and Great Britain
Comm'n for the Settlement of Claims, Rep. of Decisions 120 (1856); Uhde Case, id. at 436;
McCalmont, Greaves & Co. Case, id. at 339.
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mission determined that British subjects domiciled in Mexico were to be
regarded as nationals of Mexico and therefore could not present their
claims to the Commission. In this way, the Commission responded to
the American fear of adopting the British concept of perpetual allegiance,
according to which numerous American citizens would have been con-
sidered British subjects. Instead of refusing jurisdiction in cases of dual
nationality, 131 the Commission chose to make residence the deciding
factor. 132
In the 1860's, however, the major continental European states fol-
lowed the French example and abandoned residence as a basis for nation-
ality. This period represents the turning point in the development of the
modem concept of nationality. By 1870, the United Kingdom finally
abandoned the doctrine of perpetual allegiance.133 By 1871, the Anglo-
American Claims Commission finally rejected the idea that a country's
right of protection depended upon the residence of the injured person.134
Since that time, formal nationality and not residence has been the stan-
dard justification for diplomatic protection.
Despite official changes in policy in continental Europe, since persons
residing in the various countries at the time of promulgation of the new
laws were normally recognized as citizens, a time lag occurred before any
practical difference between the concept of residence and that of nation-
ality emerged.1 35 As time passed and the number of migrants increased,
the distinction between persons residing in the country and persons pos-
sessing formal citizenship or nationality increased in significance.
131. Such a course of action might have proved difficult in view of the fact that American
citizens of British origin were presenting claims against the United Kingdom.
132. The famous Thrasher Case, see 3 J. MooRE, supra note 94, at 817-20, and the Koszta
Case, id. at 821-54, reflect this development. See also E. BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 570-72.
These cases occurred at about the same time and raised the question whether domicile alone
or together with a declaration of intent to become a citizen was of importance for the right of
protection.
133. See British Naturalization Act of 1870, 33 Vict., ch. 14. Two years earlier, citizen-
ship had been addressed in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, supra
note 123. In 1868, the United States also passed a new Naturalization Act that expressly
permitted expatriation. See An Act Concerning the Rights of American Citizens in Foreign
States, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868).
134. This was the case of Arthur Barclay, Report of the Proceedings and Awards of the
Mixed Commission on British and American Claims, 75 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 25 (1874).
For a discussion of the importance of domicile with regard to protection in Anglo-American
practice, see C. PARRY, supra note 88, at 11-17.
135. For example, the Law Relating to Norwegian State-Citizenship etc., supra note 112,
provided:
Any foreign person domiciled in the Kingdom who, without being entered in the Register,
shall claim to have acquired the rights of a Norwegian state-citizen at the time when the
present Law comes into force, must, in order to secure such right, apply to the Authori-
ties, within one year after the said term.
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The consequences of the change in the concept of nationality emerged
slowly with regard to public international law as well. Certain protection
practices, more in keeping with the former European concept of national-
ity based on residence than with the new concept of nationality based on
more formal legal criteria, continued for some time.136 For example, the
practice of protecting seamen sailing under the flag of the state in
question, regardless of their nationality, was strongly advocated in a let-
ter of October 26, 1796 from the U.S. Secretary of State to the U.S. Am-
bassador to England. The Secretary concluded: "The measure was
natural and necessary; and hence was practiced by the consuls of other
nations as well as our own." 137 Such protection has continued to be
"natural and necessary" in the day-to-day intercourse between shipping
and coastal countries. Thus, although the practice of protecting people
with potentially stronger ties to the territory proper, but who have not
been formally naturalized, has generally given way to modern protection
practices, the practice of protecting people who have ties only to the ship,
or to "extended territory," persists. 138
States have also tended to deny protection to certain categories of na-
tionals living outside their country of nationality when it is reasonable to
believe that they have no intention of returning and taking up the duties
of citizenship, and that, consequently, their nationality is only nomi-
nal. 139 In 1873, the U.S. Secretary of State wrote to the U.S. Ambassa-
136. A right of protection is not something inherent in or deducible from "nationality,"
but rather is the result of an evolution. Van Panhuys, supra note 75, is correct when he
criticizes the judgment in the Reparations Case, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Ser-
vice of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11), on the ground that
protection there is coupled with allegiance. Van Panhuys is certainly right when he states that
"from the standpoint of international law, the right to protect does not exclusively result from
allegiance but is based on customary law that has developed gradually and to which all sorts of
circumstances. . . have contributed .... ." H. VAN PANHUYS, supra note 75, at 204.
137. 3 J. MOORE, supra note 94, § 484. The U.S. Secretary of State in 1796 was Col.
Timothy Pickering. See also E. BORCHARD, supra note 2, § 206.
138. See H. VAN PANHUYS, supra note 75, at 73: "It may seem a little curious that in
respect of aliens on what has been termed a floating part of the State's territory the rights of
the State are wider than in respect of aliens on its territory proper, including persons perma-
nently domiciled there." Seen against the historical background outlined here, the protection
of seamen does not seem as odd as Van Panhuys suggests.
139. See generally 3 J. MOORE, supra note 94, § 474 (discussion of loss of right to national
protection); E. BORCHARD, supra note 2, § 325. Parry sums up the situation: "A survey such
as this of the actual practice of States should persuade us that such a rule as that a State may
protect any one of its nationals unless he happens to be also a national of the respondent State
reflects the facts but imperfectly." Parry, supra note 79, at 704. Raestad expresses the view
that those persons who have been naturalized abroad, and who by leaving their home country
lost their original citizenship, would be excluded from protection when returning to their
country of origin. According to Raestad, protection would also be denied to citizens residing
abroad who have declared their intent to become naturalized in their country of residence or




dor to France that "[t]he duty of protection as toward the citizen, or the
rights of its exercise as toward the foreign power, is not always correla-
tive with the fact of citizenship."' 140 In many senses, then, the traditional
view of protection, based upon ties to one's residence, has prevailed to
the present time. As pointed out by Parry,141 the reasoning of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case should come as no
surprise.142 This view may provide a basis for analyzing the right of the
state of nominal nationality to protect its exile citizens.
V. The Special Position of Refugees: Ending the State of
Nationality's Right to Protection
A. The Irrelevance of a Refugee's Nationality of Origin
Despite the emergence of the concept of formal nationality rather than
residence or domicile as a basis for customary protection, states have
seldom made claims to protect their exiled nationals in any beneficial
manner. Rather, states from which refugees have fled have often
stripped them of their nationality.1 43 Even those states that have not
resorted to this measure have evinced little interest in the fates of these
refugees. 1" If states of nationality should express an interest in their
departed citizens, valid reasons exist for denying the state of nationality
the right to "protect" exiled nationals. Since the refugee has in a decisive
manner broken his ties with the government of his home country, that
government would most likely exercise "protection" not for the benefit of
the refugee, but for its own purposes. Often the only reason for the "pro-
tection" will be to harass the government of the country of asylum.145
In such a case, intervention may amount to an abuse of the right of pro-
Raestad, Diplomatisk beskyttelse av landsmenn i utlandet, 4 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFr FOR INTER-
NATIONAL RET 3, 20 (1933).
140. Letter from Mr. Hamilton Fish to Mr. E. B. Washburne (June 28, 1873), reprinted in
PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 256, 260 (1873).
See also 3 J. MOORE, supra note 94, § 474.
141. Parry, supra note 79, at 704-05.
142. This is so even if one criticizes the manner in which the Court applied the criterion of
"the individual's genuine connection with the State" to the facts before it as a condition for
real and effective nationality. Nottebohm Case (Liecht v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Second
Phase Judgment of Apr. 6).
143. See Raestad, supra note 71, at 185; W. SCHXTZEL & T. VEITER, supra note 105, at
132; Schhtzel, De-facto-Staatsangeh&igkeit und De-facto-Staatenlosigkeit, in VOLKERRECHT
UND RECHTLICHES WELTBILD 217, 220 (F. v.d. Heydte, S. Verosta, I. Seidl-Hohenveldern &
K. Zemanek eds. 1960).
144. W. SCHXTZEL & T. VErrER, supra note 105, at 135.
145. Since the Second World War, several countries of origin have amended their national-
ity laws so that loss of nationality can only be brought about by formal release by competent
authority, and such release is extremely difficult to obtain. This makes it more difficult for
countries of asylum to resist this sort of pressure.
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tection. 146 In addition, Eek is too optimistic when he states that inter-
vention will not cause inconvenience to the refugees. 147 As pointed out
by Schiitzel, intervention by the state of nationality "on behalf of" refu-
gees may cause considerable hardship for the individuals involved, and
recognition of the legitimacy of such intervention could create the im-
pression that the asylum is imperfect. 148
Furthermore, when a state grants asylum to a person, it permits him to
enter and remain in the country without asking if he has a passport and
thus without caring whether or not another country has a duty to take
him back. This inattention to the duty of admission could reasonably be
accompanied by the assertion that the country of origin has suspended its
right of protection. In its Resolution on the Legal Status of Stateless
Persons and Refugees,1 49 the Institut de Droit International asserted that
a refugee who is still formally a national of his country of origin, but who
has established his domicile or his habitual residence in another country,
should enjoy the same civil and public rights as those enjoyed by stateless
persons in that country.150 Similarly, a refugee who has lost his national-
ity could claim those civil and public rights that attached to his lost na-
tionality in the case of a mass population displacement. 151
The drafters of the Convention on the Status of Refugees were of the
opinion that the formal nationality that some refugees possessed was in-
effective, as the refugees could not in any way benefit from it. Conse-
quently, the drafters felt that refugees should not be prejudiced by it. 152
Equality of status among refugees, stateless persons, and nationals was
expressed in a principle of non-discrimination on the basis of race, reli-
gion, and country of origin. 153 Article 7, dealing with exemption from
146. See W. SCHTZEL & T. VErrIER, supra note 105, at 134-37. See also H. EEK, supra
note 94, at 69, 72-73; L. LEE, supra note 92, at 120.
147. H. EEK, supra note 94, at 70.
148. W. SCH.TZEL & T. VErrER, supra note 105, at 137.
149. Statut juridique des apatrides et des refugi6s, R6solutions vot~es par l'Institut au
cours de sa XLe session, reprinted in 2 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
292 (Session de Bruxelles, Apr. 1936).
150. Id. art. 9(2). In many instances the nationality of a refugee is uncertain or even un-
known. Hence the notion of "de facto stateless persons." See Convention on Stateless Persons,
supra note 28.
151. See Statut juridique des apatrides et des refugi6s, supra note 149, art. 9.
152. Prof. Louis Henkin of Columbia University pointed out that in the case in question it
was not only a matter of ensuring that discrimination would not be practiced against refugees
as such, but also that the High Contracting Parties would not discriminate between the refu-
gees themselves in applying the Convention or their domestic law. Some provision to that
effect was important if the legal protection of refugees was to be ensured. U.N. Doe. E/
AC.32/SR.24, at 12.
153. Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. 3. Article 3 was proposed by the
delegation of Belgium to the Ad Hoe Committee, see Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and




reciprocity, further evidenced the fact that recipient states were expected
to assimilate fully those refugees possessing a formal nationality along
with those who were stateless. 154 The principle of exemption from reci-
procity and its bolstering arguments grew out of older instruments that
wholly or largely dealt with stateless refugees. The fact that many cur-
rent refugees are not de jure stateless was not raised as a challenge to the
principle, and some participants even suggested that, if agreements of
reciprocity existed between the state of nationality and the state of
asylum, refugees could hardly invoke them.1 55 None of the drafters be-
lieved that a state granting asylum had an obligation, regardless of its
enforceability by way of diplomatic intervention, to allow refugees to
benefit from such agreements if they formally possessed the nationality of
the other party to the agreement. 56 Articles of the Convention on the
Status of Refugees designed to exempt bona fide refugees from any detri-
mental effects due to their formally possessing their original nationality
are evidence that the drafters of the Convention on the Status of Refu-
gees considered such nationality ineffective. The drafters deemed the re-
lationship between the country of nationality and the country of asylum
utterly irrelevant to the treatment of refugees.157
The continuous non-exercise of a potential right to protect exiled na-
tionals by states of origin over a protracted period of time has, therefore,
created an expectation on the part of countries of asylum that such pro-
tection will not and may not be exercised. This expectation carries suffi-
cient legal force that such a "right of protection" today can be said to be
effectively obsolete. Another exception is thus created to the rule that
nationality justifies protection. Indeed, to acknowledge such an excep-
tion is well in keeping with the "genuine connection" theory, focusing
154. Convention on the Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. 7.
155. See H. EEK, supra note 94, at 185; E. JAHN, DER V6LKERRECHTLICHE SCHUTZ VON
FLOCHTLINGEN 12-13 (1955); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 73-74; A. Ross, A
TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (1977).
156. A rule for the exemption of refugees from reciprocity was first included in the Ar-
rangement Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees, June 30, 1928, art.
4, 89 L.N.T.S. 53, 57, and subsequently in the Convention Relating to the International Status
of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, art. 14, 159 L.N.T.S. 199, 209.
157. See supra note 4. The first sentence of article 8 was borrowed loosely from the Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 44, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3546, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 316. The second sentence of
the article, which facially seems incompatible with the general principle of the ineffectiveness
of nationality in international law, as far as refugees are concerned, was initiated by the Swed-
ish delegate to the 1951 Conference, but was strongly opposed by several other delegates. It
was only included in order to prevent certain countries from having to file reservations with
regard to article 8. The meaning of the second sentence of article 8 is that in the absence of
legislative exemption, the contracting parties should honor the peculiar position of refugees
who only formally possess nationality. In appropriate cases, such refugees should be granted
exemption by means other than legislation.
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upon an individual's de facto ties and allegiance to a state which the
International Court of Justice pronounced in Nottebohm.
B. Reactivation of Nationality
Although the state of nationality has no right to protect a refugee who
has fled from it, its efforts to exercise control over the refugee may none-
theless cause such a refugee serious hardship. In particular, a refugee
whose country tries to protect him may suffer discrimination by the
country in which he is staying.158 The refugee who has retained the na-
tionality of his country of origin may thus be forced to choose between
two evils. If he chooses to apply to his national state for protection and
receives such protection, he automatically ceases to be considered a refu-
gee.159 The country of residence is obliged to recognize the reactivation
of the refugee's nationality and must allow the state of nationality to
protect him. 160
Reactivated nationality raises the issue of whether a right of protection
may be exercised with retroactive effect. Can the state of nationality in-
tervene and, in appropriate cases, claim reparation for acts committed or
omitted while the person in question was considered a refugee or must
the state of nationality claim reparation only for acts subsequent to ac-
tual reactivation? Through the inaction on the part of countries of na-
tionality, countries of asylum have acquired a legally relevant
expectation that refugees will not be protected and, consequently, that
they cannot be protected. Countries of asylum and countries of national-
ity have traditionally considered their relationships with each other to be
irrelevant to the treatment of refugees.161 Because states do not tend to
take the national character of the individual refugees into account, no
retroactive responsibility toward the state of nationality can arise out of
the treatment accorded a refugee.
Provisions of the Refugee Convention and the UNHCR Statute create
a specific problem in that a person may be considered a refugee if he is
willing but unable to avail himself of the protection of his state of nation-
ality.' 62 If a refugee remains consistently willing to avail himself of the
protection of his country of nationality, and if he has filed an application
158. The same argument may, however, be advanced with regard to stateless persons, and
even with regard to nationals living in their own country unprotected, in the international
sense, against their own government.
159. Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, art. 10(1). See also 2 A. GRAHL-
MADSEN, supra note 1, at 379.
160. Such reactivation, though, is not to be considered naturalization.
161. See Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, arts. 3, 7-9.
162. Id. art. l(A)(2); UNHCR Statute, supra note 5, para. 6(B).
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to that effect in that country's embassy or consulate, the state of national-
ity may choose to extend such protection to the refugee by granting him
a national passport and allowing him to return there. Until this happens,
however, the person must be considered a refugee,1 63 and the country of
asylum should be obliged to treat him as such. This obligation carries
with it the corresponding right on the part of the country granting asy-
lum to refuse intervention by the country of nationality on behalf of the
refugee. 164
A peculiar situation arises if a refugee registers at the consulate of the
country of which he is a national and obtains a national passport without
intending to renounce his refugee status. If the person still fears persecu-
tion and does not understand that obtaining a passport normally means
availing oneself of the protection of the issuing state, it would obviously
be difficult to withdraw refugee status on the basis of such a confused act.
A refugee who happens to be in possession of a national passport at the
time of becoming a refugee is not normally required to return or to sur-
render such passport, which remains prima facie proof of nationality but
is no longer an instrument of protection. The same approach is justified
with regard to a passport acquired after refugee status has been obtained,
but without an understanding of the implications of the acquisition. The
mere issuance of such a passport gives no title to protection.1 65 A refugee
should lose his refugee status and regain his status as an alien possessing
the effective nationality of the issuing country only if, with full knowl-
edge of the consequences, he submits his passport to the authorities of his
new country of residence and requests a visa so that he may continue his
stay in that country as a national of his country of origin.
C. The Role for Third States
If a refugee leaves the country where he has been recognized as a refu-
gee, any other state may rule independently on his eligibility as a refugee.
If he is admitted to the territory of another state on the basis of a travel
document, that state may, like the state issuing the document, refuse to
recognize any protection by the nationality state. Consequently, it may
163. See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 27, at 367-70.
164. Furthermore, protection extended to a refugee falling into this category should have
no retroactive effect. Because of the refugee's willingness to accept protection, the state of
nationality had the power to grant protection at an earlier date. It is hardly equitable that the
country of asylum should be forced to allow the state of nationality to intervene merely be-
cause of the latter's hesitance in granting protection earlier.
165. The situation therefore parallels the issuance of a passport or the issuance of a travel
document to a national who is also a national of the country in which the consulate is located.
Convention on Status of Refugees, supra note 4, Schedule, para. 16.
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reject any intervention by the state of the refugee's nationality on his
behalf. The country admitting the refugee may not even know the partic-
ular nationality of the refugee to whom it is extending its hospitality.
The specimen travel document annexed to the Refugee Convention, for
example, contains no reference to the holder's nationality. 166 Thus, the
admitting state enters into an international relationship only with the is-
suing state. On the other hand, if a refugee in possession of a national
passport, issued by a competent authority of his country of nationality, is
admitted to a third country on the strength of that document, it would be
equitable for the third state to treat him in every respect as a national of
the issuing state rather than as a refugee. If this creates hardship for the
fleeing person, he can either apply for refugee status in the country where
he finds himself, or he can proceed to another country where he will be
given refugee status. Once a state recognizes a person admitted on a
national passport as a bona fide refugee, it should be able to reject any
intervention attempts by the state of the refugee's nationality. 167
Conclusion
A modern view of international refugee law must recognize that a refu-
gee's state of origin lacks any right to "protect" the refugee. This doc-
trine is both coherent and equitable. It is consistent with the generally
accepted view that "such a rule as that a State may protect any one of its
nationals unless he happens to be also a national of the respondent State
reflects the facts but imperfectly." 168 Furthermore, it advances the "gen-
uine connection" concept professed by the International Court of Justice
in the Nottebohm Case. The doctrine is based on the express manifesta-
tions of a refugee's will, the breaking of ties between him and his state of
nationality, and his pursuit and attainment of asylum. Indeed, the the-
ory emerges as a logical result of the link between a state's naturalization
of a refugee and its granting of refugee status. A country of asylum can
always legitimately naturalize the refugee 169 and, on that basis, reject any
claim of protection by the country of origin.' 70 The same right to resist
166. Id. Annex to Schedule.
167. This may apply even to an asylum-seeker whose refugee status has not yet been
recognized.
168. See Parry, supra note 79, at 704.
169. P. WEIs, supra note 29, at 98; see also N. BAR-YAAcov, DUAL NATIONALITY 141-42
(1961).
170. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 116 (W. Ger.), according to which ethnic Germans
expelled from Eastern Europe automatically become German citizens. Schiitzel, supra note
143, at 221, considers their status to be that of de facto nationals, and he comments that with
the de facto nationality the old concept of nationality based on residence is revived.
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intervention by the state of nationality should, then, arise from the grant-
ing of asylum.' 7'
The doctrine succeeds in bringing about a crucial balance between the
right of protection and the duty of admission, the two most important
concomitants of nationality in international law. 172 The state of nation-
ality, if it refuses to admit the national, effectively gives up its right to
"protect" him in any way. Conversely, by granting asylum, a state would
relieve the state of nationality of its duty to admit its national. As long as
the national were recognized as a refugee, the state of refuge would pos-
sess the exclusive right of protection. Only by assuring both the refugee
and his state of refuge that the state of origin has lost any right to act "on
behalf" of its exiled national can international law assure that the refu-
gee will find genuine protection in his place of asylum.
171. This doctrine may also serve to throw light on rules regarding protection of dual
nationals in a third country. To explore that proposition, however, would go beyond the scope
of this study. See e.g., P. WEIS, supra note 29, at 196-99; N. BAR-YAACOV, supra note 169, at
232 n.68.
172. See generally P. WEIS, supra note 29, at 35-62.
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